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Research Seminar & RTG Day

09.01.2024 (16:15 – 17:30, Online via Zoom) – Maksym Obrizan (Kyiv School of Economics)
“Poverty, Unemployment and Displacement in Ukraine: three months into the war”
This paper identifies the causal effects of full-scale kremlin aggression on socio-economic outcomes in Ukraine three months into the full-scale war. First, forced migration after February 24th, 2022 is associated with an elevated risk of becoming unemployed by 7.5% points. Second, difference-in-difference regressions show that in regions with fighting on the ground females without a higher education face a 9.6-9.9% points higher risk of not having enough money for food. Finally, in the regions subject to ground attack females with and without a higher education, as well as males without a higher education are more likely to become unemployed by 6.1-6.9%, 4.2-4.7% and 6.5-6.6% points correspondingly. This persistent gender gap in poverty and unemployment, when even higher education is not protective for females, calls for policy action. While more accurate results may obtain with more comprehensive surveys, this paper provides a remarkably robust initial estimate of the war’s effects on poverty, unemployment and internal migration.

16.01.2024 (16:15 – 17:30, TU Dortmund Math Tower Room 127) – Erik Bengtsson (Lund University)
“The Social Origins of Democracy and Authoritarianism Reconsidered: Prussia and Sweden in Comparison”
The implications of land inequality for politics and democratization is a classical debate in social sciences and political economy. A recurring argument is what the political scientist Carles Boix has formulated as that “The absence of landlordism constitutes a necessary precondition for the triumph of democracy”. We revisit this debate by studying two in various ways crucial cases: Prussia, the locus classicus of the pernicious effects of landlordism, and Sweden, often perceived to be Prussia’s opposite, as a farmer-dominated social structure led to stable democratization. Our comparison shows the flaws of these interpretations: on standard measures of land inequality, Sweden was more unequal than Prussia in the late 1800s, but nevertheless, obviously, the political outcomes were very different. We explore why land inequality had such different effects on politics in Sweden compared to Prussia, utilizing various measures of land inequality (share of land held by nobles; distribution of farm sizes; presence of large estates), looking at 241 election districts in Sweden from the imposition of universal male suffrage in 1909 to the 1940s, and 236 election districts in Prussia for all general election between 1871 and 1912. Land inequality, in its different measures, had no negative effect on vote participation in Sweden, no positive effect on the Conservative vote share, and no negative effect on the Socialist vote share. We explore why in a qualitative-historical section focusing on Scania, the most unequal region in Sweden but also the hotbed of democratic movements. For Prussia, land inequality is correlated with votes for the conservative party, however, not with turnout as measure of democratic participation. We relate the (in part) opposing findings to the different responses to growing import competition during the first wave of globalization.

23.01.2023 (16:15 – 17:30, TU Dortmund Math Tower Room 127) – Christian Traxler (Hertie School)

“The Direct and Indirect Effects of Stimulus Policy: Evidence from Germany’s Cash for Clunkers Program”

We evaluate the impact of Germany’s 2009 “Cash for Clunkers” program (Umweltprämie). Following the approach from Mian and Sufi (2012), we first provide evidence suggesting that the program did not merely stimulate demand through pull-forward effects. Instead it led to additional vehicle purchases that would not have occurred in the absence of the program. Leveraging unique micro data that cover the universe of all registered cars in Germany, we then explore different reasons behind this finding. Based on a regression discontinuity design that exploits an age-based cutoff in the program eligibility, we identify non-trivial peer effects in car purchases: a higher share of program eligible neighbors induces further car purchases. We discuss channels driving these spillovers and quantify its implications for the program’s efficacy and optimal program design.

Please find further information [here](#).

RWI – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung

23.01.2024 (11:00 CET, E-Werk or Microsoft Teams) - Dr. Madeline Werthschulte (Heidelberg University)

“Residential Gas Savings during Peak Prices - Evidence from the Field”

Please find further information either [here](#) or [here](#).

Essen Health Economics

08.01.2024 (12:00 - 13:00, WST-C.12.09) - Alexander Ahammer (Johannes Kepler University Linz)

15.01.2024 (12:00 - 13:00, WST-C.12.09) - Maarten Lindeboom (Vrije Uni Amsterdam)

22.01.2024 (12:00 - 13:00, WST-C.12.09) - Sunčica Vujić (University of Antwerp)

Please find further information [here](#).

University DUISBURG-ESSEN

Campus Duisburg – MSM Research Seminars

10.01.2024 (16:30 – 17:30, LB 338) – Oliver Bos (ENS Paris-Saclay)

“Auctions with Signaling Bidders: Optimal Design and Information Disclosure (with Martin Pollrich)”

We study optimal auctions in a symmetric private values setting, where bidders have signaling concerns: they care about winning the object and a receiver's inference about their type. Signaling concerns arise in various economic situations such as takeover bidding, charity auctions, procurement and art auctions. We show that auction revenue can be decomposed into the standard revenue from the respective auction without signaling concern, and a signaling component. The latter is the bidders' ex-ante expected signaling value net of an endogenous outside option: the signaling value for the lowest type. The revenue decomposition restores revenue equivalence between different auction designs, provided that the same information about bids is revealed. Revealing information about submitted bids affects revenue via the endogenous outside option. In general, revenue is not monotone in information revelation: revealing more information about submitted bids may reduce revenue. We show that any bid disclosure rule allowing to distinguish whether a bidder submitted a bid or abstained from participation minimizes the outside option, and therefore maximizes revenue.

24.01.2024 (16:30 – 17:30, LB 338) – Giorgio Ottonello (Nova)

“Excess Volatility in Professional Stock Return Forecasts”

Consensus professional forecasts of stock returns are three times more volatile than those of non-professionals and econometricians. This “excess” volatility in professional forecasts is not due to noise. Rather, professional forecasts respond immediately, strongly, and countercyclically to macro shocks. Business cycle, technology, and oil supply shocks each account for 20% to 40% of the total variation in the difference between professional and other forecasts. We also replicate prior work's finding that professional forecasts of GDP growth are no more responsive to macro shocks than those of non-professionals and econometricians. We argue that professionals' forecasts of stock returns respond differently from (i) other forecasts of stock returns and (ii) professional forecasts of macro variables, because they are better able to identify discount rate shocks. To this end, we run a two-stage test using standard discount rate proxies. In the first stage, we identify “shock-sensitive” proxies as those for which macro shocks are strong instruments. In the second stage, the shock-sensitive proxies, and particular the part instrumented using macro shocks, strongly predict professional forecasts. Our survey-based evidence complements standard present-value findings that macro shocks lead to time variation in professionals' expected returns. We conclude that professionals are particularly adept at correctly identifying discount rate fluctuations from macro shocks. In contrast to us, a large literature in macro-finance finds that consensus forecasts of professionals are no better than other forecasts.

31.01.2024 (16:30 – 17:30, LB 338) – Mathijs Cosemans (Erasmus University)

TOPIC TBA

Please find further information [here](#).

Campus Duisburg – Institute for Socioeconomics

10.01.2024 (16:00 – 17:30, Zoom) - M. V. Lee Badgett (University of Massachusetts-Amherst)
“Qualitative Research on Economic Empowerment Programs for LGBTI People in the Global South”

17.01.2024 (16:00 – 17:30, Room LE 105) - Melanie Jäger-Erben (Brandenburgische Technische Universität)
“Neue Technik allein ist keine Lösung - Feministische Perspektiven auf den Technofix”

24.01.2024 (16:00 – 17:30, Room LE 105) - Kai Koddenbrock (Bard College Berlin)
“Postkoloniale Politische Ökonomie”

Please find further information [here](#)

Campus Essen – Economics Seminars

10.01.2024 (14:15 – 15:45, R11 T03 C82) – Florian Ziel (University of Duisburg-Essen)
“Trading in hourly and quarter-hourly electricity price auctions”

17.01.2024 (14:15 – 15:45, Virtally) – Chloe N. East (University of Colorado Denver)
“The Effect of Means-Tested Transfers on Work: Evidence from Quasi-Randomly Assigned SNAP Caseworkers”

24.01.2024 (14:15 – 15:45, R11 T03 C82) – Rebecca Leber (University of Duisburg-Essen)
“The Impact of Length of Hospital Stay on Mortality and Healthcare Usage”

Please find further information [here](#).

TU Dortmund

Economics Seminar

08.01.2024 (16:15 – 17:15, Vogelpothsweg 87, Room 127) – Eduard Storm (RWI Essen)
“From Code to Cash: The Impact of AI on Wages (joint with Myrielle Gonschor)”

15.01.2024 (16:15 – 17:15, Vogelpothsweg 87, Room 127) – Niklas Hübner
“Military Service and Health outcomes in the GDR”

Please find further information [here](#).